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ADMINISTRATION OF WAR
JOHN YOO†
INTRODUCTION
“Of all the cares or concerns of government,” Alexander
Hamilton wrote, “the direction of war most peculiarly demands those
1
qualities which distinguish the exercise of power by a single hand.”
“The direction of war implies the direction of the common strength,”
he continued in Federalist 74, “and the power of directing and
employing the common strength, forms a usual and essential part in
2
the definition of the executive authority.” To avoid the “mischiefs”
and “dissensions” that would arise from multiple commanders, the
Framers vested the power to conduct war, the Commander-in-Chief
3
power, in a single president.
This decision, over which there was little dissent in the
4
Philadelphia or state ratifying conventions, might lead one to think
that the president would exercise greater control over the military
than over any other part of the executive branch. We do not
commonly think of the armed forces of the United States as an
agency, in part because it does not fall within the Administrative
Procedure Act’s basic provisions. Nonetheless, the military is part of

Copyright © 2009 by John Yoo.
† Fletcher Jones Distinguished Visiting Professor of Law, Chapman University School of
Law (2008–09); Professor of Law, School of Law, University of California, Berkeley; Visiting
Scholar, American Enterprise Institute.
I thank Tim Canova, Jesse Choper, Daniel Farber, Anne Joseph O’Connell, and Ron
Rotunda for their comments. This paper benefited from comments received at the
constitutional law workshop at Georgetown University Law Center. Janet Galeria provided
excellent research assistance.
1. THE FEDERALIST NO. 74, at 500 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
2. Id.
3. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70, at 473 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
4. See, e.g., JOHN YOO, THE POWERS OF WAR AND PEACE: THE CONSTITUTION AND
FOREIGN AFFAIRS AFTER 9/11, at 153–55 (2005); Saikrishna Prakash, The Essential Meaning of
Executive Power, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 701, 772–74; Saikrishna Prakash & Michael D. Ramsey,
The Executive Power Over Foreign Affairs, 111 YALE L.J. 231, 285 (2001).
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the permanent government, as are the other agencies, and indeed is
the most important and the oldest—the army and navy were created
to protect the nation’s security during the Revolutionary War,
predating the Constitution itself.
Academic and judicial debates over the chief executive’s
direction of the administrative state have centered over whether
Article II’s grant of “the Executive Power” included the authority to
5
remove all subordinate officers of the United States. Presidents have
long argued that their executive power includes the power to remove
inferior officers without the permission of Congress, thereby giving
them the authority to direct the operations of the executive branch.
Critics respond that Congress’s constitutional authority to create
administrative agencies in the first place should give it the ability to
condition the removal of their officers. Article II contains no
discussion of removal; it only describes the Senate’s joint “advice and
consent” role in the appointment of principal officers and Congress’s
6
role in the creation of inferior offices. The Constitution could be read
to require the same process for the removal of officers as for their
appointment.
The judiciary has not fully accepted either argument. In
7
Morrison v. Olson, the Supreme Court recognized that “there are
some ‘purely executive’ officials who must be removable by the
President at will if he is to be able to accomplish his constitutional
8
role.” Nonetheless, it also allowed Congress to make officers
removable only “for cause” if the need for independence from
presidential control is great enough and does not interfere with the
9
executive’s constitutional functions. Thus, the Court upheld the
independent counsel’s protections from presidential removal because

5. See, e.g., Morrison v. Olson, 487 U.S. 654, 685–93 (1988) (“good cause” removal
provision for independent counsel does not impermissibly burden president’s power to control
executive officials); Bowsher v. Synar, 478 U.S. 714, 722–23, 726–27 (1986) (“[W]e conclude that
Congress cannot reserve for itself the power of removal of an officer charged with the execution
of the laws except by impeachment.”); Steven G. Calabresi & Saikrishna B. Prakash, The
President’s Power to Execute the Laws, 104 YALE L.J. 541, 596–97 (1994) (president must have
removal power to maintain control over executive branch personnel); Lawrence Lessig & Cass
R. Sunstein, The President and the Administration, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 26–28 & n.119 (1994)
(no consensus among Framers that president had complete authority to remove inferior
officers).
6. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2.
7. Morrison, 487 U.S. at 654.
8. Id. at 690 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r v. United States, 295 U.S. 602, 627–29 (1935)).
9. Id. at 687, 689–91 (quoting Humphrey’s Ex’r, 295 U.S. at 631).
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its independence was necessary to secure the impartial investigation
of the president and his advisers, while, according to the Court, the
president and the attorney general still retained some ability to direct
10
its activities.
At issue in these debates are more than simply personnel issues
such as firing underperforming employees. Power over removal is a
proxy for control over the administrative state. According to
proponents of a broad reading of Article II, a president must have the
unrestricted authority to fire an officer to ensure that all subordinates
11
in the executive branch obey his commands. Otherwise, the
president cannot ensure a uniform interpretation and enforcement of
the Constitution and other federal laws, as required by Article II’s
Take Care Clause. Defenders of congressional prerogatives claim that
the power of administration goes unmentioned in Article II, and so
12
the legislature can create and regulate it. Expanded congressional
control is also necessary, according to some accounts, to balance the
vast growth of presidential power during and since the New Deal
revolution.
Presidential control over the armed forces has been missing from
these debates, perhaps because the Administrative Procedure Act
13
contains significant exceptions for military activity. But presidential
control over the Armed Forces presents a number of difficult
questions that test the links between constitutional authority and
control over the administrative state. In the military sphere, for
example, the Commander-in-Chief Clause’s placement in Article II
seems to grant presidents a level of control over this most important

10. Id. at 691–93.
11. See, e.g., Calabresi & Prakash, supra note 4, at 597 (“Inferior executive officers are,
after all, the President’s men and women, assisting him in the exercise of his constitutional
powers. If he decides that they are impeding his administrative program or are simply doing a
poor job in providing what Hamilton might have called an ‘energetic’ administration, he must
be able to replace them with others.”).
12. See, e.g., Lessig & Sunstein, supra note 4, at 47, 54 (“[B]eyond these enumerated
aspects of ‘the executive power’ is an undefined range of powers that we would now describe as
‘administrative power,’ marking a domain within which one has a duty to act according not to
one’s own judgment, but according to the standards or objectives of a law. With respect to these
latter powers, Congress has wide discretion to vest them in officers operating under or beyond
the plenary power of the President.”).
13. The Administrative Procedure Act excludes from its definition of an “agency” both
“courts martial and military commissions” and “military authority exercised in the field in time
of war or in occupied territory.” 5 U.S.C. §§ 551(1)(F)–(G) (2006). It also excludes from its
rulemaking and adjudication requirements “military or foreign affairs” functions. Id. 5 U.S.C. §
553(a)(1) (2006) (rulemaking); id. § 554(a)(4) (adjudication).
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of agencies that goes beyond the removal power. The clause
constitutionally guarantees the president’s authority to issue binding
14
orders to subordinate officers. Even if inferior officers refused to
carry out presidential orders, the Commander-in-Chief Clause would
seem to include the power to promote or demote officers and to make
duty assignments. These powers would be central components of a
president’s ability to decide on strategy and tactics and ensure that
the officers who are in place will carry them out. Ultimately, the
clause might be read as an alternative source for a removal power,
albeit one that applied only to military officers, even if Article II’s
Vesting Clause was thought not to provide one for the executive
branch as a whole.
Functional reasons for a presidential removal power over the
military supplement those arising from the formal constitutional text
and structure. War demands a unity of purpose and command; the
stakes are high, if not the highest. “Decision, activity, secrecy, and
15
dispatch” are at a premium. Conflicting orders from different
commanders, or even the creation of ambiguity, could spell military
16
disaster. The executive, as Hamilton observed in the eighteenth
century and Justice Sutherland in the twentieth, is structured for
17
speed and decisiveness in the conduct of foreign affairs. “In the
conduct of war, in which the energy of the executive is the bulwark of
the national security,” Hamilton wrote, “every thing would be to be
18
apprehended from its plurality.” Instead, “the arrangement of the
army and navy, the direction of the operations of war,” Publius
continued in Federalist 72, “constitute what seems to be most
properly understood by the administration of government,” and
hence “falls peculiarly within the province of the executive
19
department.” As Justice Sutherland wrote for the Court in United
20
States v. Curtiss-Wright: “In this vast external realm, with its

14. U.S. CONST. art. II, § 2, cl. 2 (“The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army
and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the
actual Service of the United States . . . .”).
15. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 472.
16. See id. (“Decision, activity, secrecy, and dispatch will generally characterise [sic] the
proceedings of one man, in a much more eminent degree, than the proceedings of any greater
number; and in proportion as the number is increased, these qualities will be diminished.”).
17. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304, 319 (1936).
18. THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton), supra note 3, at 476.
19. THE FEDERALIST NO. 72, at 487 (Alexander Hamilton) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., 1961).
20. United States v. Curtiss-Wright Export Corp., 299 U.S. 304 (1936).
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important, complicated, delicate and manifold problems, the
President alone has the power to speak or listen as a representative of
21
the nation.” Quoting from a Senate report, Justice Sutherland
further explained that “[t]he nature of transactions with foreign
nations . . . requires caution and unity of design, and their success
22
frequently depends on secrecy and dispatch.” Regardless of one’s
view of executive control over the civilian agencies, these
considerations persuade that the president enjoys an elevated
constitutional authority over the military.
This makes all the more puzzling one of the striking
developments in administrative law under President George W. Bush:
the reduction in the executive’s control over the armed forces.
Administrative law scholarship has generally passed over the study of
the military in favor of the domestic agencies. This is an oversight,
because the armed forces are arguably the most important of all of
the elements of the administrative state. Military interference in
civilian affairs is of great concern in many other countries, as it was to
23
the Framers in their worry about standing armies. Modern and
ancient history is replete with examples of generals overthrowing
civilian governments. Civilian control of the military is perhaps the
most important principle of the American constitutional system of
government. Yet it is expressed nowhere in the document except in
the Commander-in-Chief Clause, which scholars primarily discuss in
24
terms of its role in the war powers debate.
Administrative law scholarship should pay attention to the
armed forces not just because it performs the most important function
of the executive branch, but because it is the largest part of the
executive branch. Expenditures for the Defense Department reached
$530 billion in 2007, and are estimated to rise to $583 billion in 2008
and $651 billion in 2009 before supplemental bills for the Afghanistan
25
and Iraq conflicts are included. Military spending will consume 21
percent of the federal budget in 2009, down from 47 percent in 1962,
but will still constitute the second largest source of government
21. Id. at 319.
22. Id. (citation omitted).
23. See YOO, supra note 4, at 55–87 (describing Anti-Federalist fear of standing armies).
24. See, e.g., LOUIS FISHER, PRESIDENTIAL WAR POWER 12–14 (2d ed. 2004); YOO, supra
note 4, at 143–55.
25. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT, BUDGET
OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at 49 (2008), available at
http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/browse.html.
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spending after welfare and entitlement programs (24 percent). In
27
2007, 1.4 million men and women served in the armed forces and
651,000 civilians worked in the Defense Department, while 1.2 million
28
civilians served in the rest of the executive branch. The military’s
large workforce and nationwide reach has led to a steady expansion
of its responsibilities, including not just national defense but also drug
29
interdiction, border control, and disaster relief.
To the extent that administrative law scholars have touched on
the military, they have tended to focus on the question of delegated
authority, with James Q. Wilson’s study of army bureaucracy being an
30
important exception. In the war on terrorism, the debate has
centered on whether the president can exercise independent
constitutional authority to conduct hostilities in response to the 9/11
attacks, whether Congress must authorize the use of military force,
and what the limits of Congress’s authorization might be. Cass
Sunstein and Eric Posner, for example, turn to administrative law
principles, such as the familiar Chevron doctrine and clear statement
rules, to understand what deference is due to the president in
interpreting the Authorization to Use Military Force, passed on
September 18, 2001, the Detainee Treatment Act, and other foreign
31
relations statutes. This inquiry applies understandings of the

26. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT,
HISTORICAL TABLES: BUDGET OF THE UNITED STATES GOVERNMENT, FISCAL YEAR 2009, at
80 tbl.4.2 (2008), available at http://www.gpoaccess.gov/usbudget/fy09/pdf/hist.pdf. These figures
do not include the effects of the stimulus bill passed by Congress in early 2009 to address an
economic recession.
27. Id. at 335 tbl.17.5.
28. Id. at 329 tbl.17.1.
29. Military doctrine refers to these efforts as “military operations other than war,” which
includes the support of civilian authorities during crises and disaster relief. Discussion of
military doctrine in these areas can be found in U.S. DEP’T OF THE ARMY, FIELD MANUAL 10019: DOMESTIC SUPPORT OPERATIONS (1993). One of the more significant expansions of the
military role in domestic affairs occurred with the passage of the 1981 Military Cooperation with
Law Enforcement Act, 10 U.S.C. §§ 371–74 (2006), which permitted extensive military support
for anti-drug operations. Nonetheless, the Posse Comitatus Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1385 (2006), forbids
the military from enforcing the law within the United States, unless otherwise permitted by the
Constitution or other federal laws.
30. See generally JAMES Q. WILSON, BUREAUCRACY: WHAT GOVERNMENT AGENCIES
DO AND WHY THEY DO IT (1989).
31. See generally Eric A. Posner & Cass R. Sunstein, Chevronizing Foreign Relations Law,
116 YALE L.J. 1170 (2007) (applying Chevron to foreign relations law, both directly and by
analogy); Cass R. Sunstein, Administrative Law Goes to War, 118 HARV. L. REV. 2663 (2005)
(applying “the logic of Chevron . . . to the exercise of executive authority in the midst of war”);
Cass R. Sunstein, Clear Statement Principles and National Security: Hamdan and Beyond, 2006
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delegation of authority to the administrative state to delineate the
boundaries of the president’s authority to use force, and its subsidiary
issues, in war.
This Essay seeks to expand the field of inquiry. Delegations of
wartime authority to the executive branch are a subset of the broader
issue of control of the military, just as studying a single statutory
delegation of rulemaking falls within the larger story of the struggle
between the president, Congress, and the courts for direction of the
administrative state. Are the armed forces implementing the policies
of the president and Congress, how much freedom does it have to
pursue its own preferences, what mechanisms exist to control the
military, and what influence should judicial review have on control?
The absence of any military coups in American history might lead
one to think that civilian control of the military in the United States is
safe and sound. But this conclusion causes scholars to overlook the
same interesting questions that characterize the study of the
administrative state: whether the armed forces have pursued their
own policy preferences by subtly dividing the political leadership,
pushed forward in areas of statutory ambiguity or lax presidential
monitoring, and limited the options presented to civilians. This Essay
begins to address these questions. Part I describes the military’s
growing policy independence. Part II proposes a framework—the
principal-agent model—to analyze that growing independence.
Finally, Part III, explores how presidents can reduce military-civilian
tensions through centralization and decentralization.
I. THE MILITARY’S GROWING INDEPENDENCE
Broadening the inquiry beyond well-known examples of conflict,
such as President Harry Truman’s firing of General Douglas
MacArthur or President Abraham Lincoln’s removal of General
32
George McClellan, leads to important perspectives on relations
between the civilian and military leadership during the Bush
administration. Military historians and scholars observe that civilianmilitary relations have been in something of a crisis since the end of

SUP. CT. REV. 1 (tracing clear statement rules in national security versus individual liberties
cases throughout American history to the present).
32. See generally ELIOT COHEN, SUPREME COMMAND: SOLDIERS, STATESMEN, AND
LEADERSHIP IN WARTIME (2002).
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33

the Cold War. What some scholars view as a serious problem can be
understood as the success of the military in gaining significant policy
independence from the political leadership. Descriptively, this is no
different than the account of a federal agency managing to prevail in
pursuing its own preferences at the expense of those of the president
or Congress. This Part will describe the military’s growing policy
independence from civilian control; then Part II will propose a model
for understanding it.
President Truman’s firing of General MacArthur provides an
34
example of the signs of the relevant phenomenon. General
35
MacArthur was not conspiring to overthrow civilian government.
Instead, he wanted a space for policy independence from civilian
36
preferences. At the time of his removal, General MacArthur was
one of the United States’ most distinguished military leaders. In
defeating the Japanese in World War II, he had recovered more
territory, with fewer forces at his disposal, and with less casualties,
37
than American forces on the European front. He had governed the
reconstruction of Japan and reversed American defeat in Korea with
38
the daring landing at Inchon. After Communist China intervened in
late 1950, MacArthur demanded that American forces expand the
39
conflict into China proper to pursue victory on the peninsula.
President Truman, however, decided that the United States would
limit the fighting to Korea and seek a settlement along pre-war
40
borders. When MacArthur continued to make public statements at
41
odds with civilian policy, Truman fired him. MacArthur returned to
the United States to a hero’s welcome. When addressing a joint
session of Congress, he questioned whether military officers owed
“primary allegiance and loyalty to those who temporarily exercise the

33. See generally Richard H. Kohn, The Erosion of Civilian Control of the Military in the
United States Today, NAVAL WAR C. REV., Summer 2002, at 9 (demonstrating that, although
there may be no crisis, “civilian control has diminished to the point where it could alter the
character of American government and undermine national defense”).
34. For a popular history, see generally WILLIAM MANCHESTER, AMERICAN CAESAR:
DOUGLAS MACARTHUR 1880–1964 (1978).
35. Id. at 629–30.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 690–91.
38. Id. at 439–628.
39. Id. at 601–22.
40. Id. at 622.
41. Id. at 643–44.
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authority of the executive branch of Government, rather than to the
42
country and its Constitution which they are sworn to defend.”
After General MacArthur’s firing, civilian-military relations
continued without many problems. This is not to say that there were
no strains on the relationship during specific crises, such as the Cuban
Missile Crisis, where the Kennedy administration worried that
military leaders might spark a war without authorization, or during
longer struggles, such as the Vietnam War. The lessons some
prominent thinkers in the armed forces took away from the Vietnam
War, however, was not that the strategy or tactics were mistaken, but
that the military had allowed civilians to intrude too deeply into
43
operational decisions. Despite, or perhaps because of, the stresses of
the Vietnam War and Soviet strategic parity in the 1970s, however,
military leaders appeared generally to defer to civilian control during
44
the Cold War period. The most influential thinker on civil-military
relations during the Cold War, Samuel Huntington, had predicted
that the level of external threat from the Soviet Union would pressure
American society to become more conservative—in the sense of
limitations on individual rights and less suspicion of the military—and
to make the armed forces more professional and independent from
45
society. Yet leading scholars have observed that civilian control over
the military did not suffer significant disruptions under the pressures
46
of the Cold War. Rather, it was the end of the Cold War that
47
ushered in a deterioration in the relationship.
Poor relations began with the election of Bill Clinton, the first
president since World War II who had not served in the military.
Observers speculate that the military already had its doubts about
Clinton even before he assumed office, because of his apparent
48
efforts to avoid the Vietnam War draft. Clinton’s focus on domestic
42. 97 CONG. REC. app. at A4722 (1951) (statement of General Douglas MacArthur).
43. The most influential work along these lines is probably H.R. MCMASTER,
DERELICTION OF DUTY: LYNDON JOHNSON, ROBERT MCNAMARA, THE JOINT CHIEFS OF
STAFF, AND THE LIES THAT LED TO VIETNAM (1997).
44. See MICHAEL C. DESCH, CIVILIAN CONTROL OF THE MILITARY: THE CHANGING
SECURITY ENVIRONMENT 22–29 (1999).
45. SAMUEL P. HUNTINGTON, THE SOLDIER AND THE STATE: THE THEORY AND
POLITICS OF CIVIL-MILITARY RELATIONS 456–57, 463–64 (1957).
46. DESCH, supra note 44, at 22–35.
47. Id.
48. DALE R. HERSPRING, THE PENTAGON AND THE PRESIDENCY: CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS FROM FDR TO GEORGE W. BUSH 335 (2005) (“The generals and admirals had
reservations about Clinton when he came to office. First, there was the issue of the draft. Like
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affairs reinforced the view that he was uninterested in foreign affairs
and intended to use the military to engage in experiments on the role
50
of gays and women in society. Officers were disturbed by Clinton’s
decisionmaking style, which was somewhat ad hoc, resistant to formal
51
structures and processes, and always open to change. It did not help
matters that the administration’s budgets sought a “peace dividend”
52
through reduced defense spending. Officers believed that Clinton’s
leadership in conflicts—Somalia, Haiti, Bosnia, and Kosovo—was
lacking and that he was calling on the military to perform missions
53
that distracted from the winning of wars.
President Clinton’s decision to reverse the military’s ban on
openly gay soldiers, made four days after he assumed office,
54
guaranteed conflict with the armed services. General Colin Powell,
the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, publicly opposed Clinton’s
55
position. Military leaders conducted a lobbying effort in Congress to
reverse the president’s decision and leaked stories to the press that
56
mass resignations would occur when his decision took effect. They
cooperated with retired officers, who publicly criticized the
57
commander-in-chief’s decision. Ultimately, Clinton backed down
and adopted the “don’t ask, don’t tell policy” favored by Powell and
58
the Joint Chiefs and later adopted by statute. Civilian and uniformed
leaders struggled over other social issues, such as sexual harassment
and the role of women in combat, for the rest of the Clinton
administration.
Tension in civil-military relations rose sharply over the use of
force abroad. Military officers attributed the debacle in Somalia to
many of his compatriots, Clinton did his best to manipulate the system to avoid being drafted
during the Vietnam War.”).
49. Id. at 333.
50. Id. at 338.
51. Id. at 332.
52. Id. at 297.
53. See id. at 331–35.
54. See Memorandum on Ending Discrimination in the Armed Forces, 1 PUB. PAPERS 23
(Jan. 29, 1993).
55. HERSPRING, supra note 48, at 341 (noting that Powell publicly stated that
“homosexuality is not a benign behavior characteristic such as skin color”).
56. See, e.g., Melissa Healy, Uproar over Gays in Military Muted at Ft. Knox, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 1992, at A1 (“In Washington, where the political battle over lifting the ban [on gays in
the military] has already been joined, top commanders have warned pointedly of the potential
for plunging morale, mass resignations, and a breakdown in discipline . . . .”).
57. Id. at 339.
58. See id. at 342.
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mission creep—the Clinton administration had expanded a limited
intervention to provide humanitarian aid into a nation-building
59
exercise. When eighteen American soldiers died during a strike
against a Somali warlord, some military officers blamed the civilian
political leadership for refusing to authorize the dispatch of armored
units. The human rights crisis in the former Yugoslavia brought
military resistance to the Clinton administration’s approach to the use
of force out into the open. General Powell, while serving as chairman
of the Joint Chiefs, gave an on-the-record interview to the New York
60
Times opposing military intervention in Bosnia and wrote an
opinion piece in the same newspaper a month before the 1992
61
presidential elections explaining why. Powell sought to influence
policy before civilians in both the executive branch and Congress had
decided how to stop Serbian attacks on Bosnian Muslims. When the
Clinton administration attempted to develop a policy in the spring of
1993, Powell continued to oppose any use of ground troops and
62
advised that air strikes would have limited effect.
Resistance to White House preferences extended to
international law as well. In 1997, countries opened for signature an
international convention to ban the use of anti-personnel land
63
mines. The United States participated in the negotiations and all of
its NATO allies joined the treaty, although major powers such as
64
Russia and China did not. President Clinton apparently wanted the
United States to join the convention, but the military successfully
65
lobbied inside the executive branch to scuttle the idea. The Clinton
administration also sent a team to participate in the drafting of the
Rome Statute, which established the International Criminal Court in
66
1998. Even though President Clinton signed the treaty, it had little

59. Id. at 343–48 (describing disagreement between President Clinton and military leaders
with regard to the scope of the military’s mission in Somalia).
60. Michael R. Gordon, Powell Delivers a Resounding No on Using Limited Force in
Bosnia, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 27, 1992, at A1.
61. Colin L. Powell, Why Generals Get Nervous, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8, 1992, at A35.
62. HERSPRING, supra note 52, at 355–56.
63. Convention on the Prohibition of the Use, Stockpiling, Production and Transfer of
Anti-Personnel Mines and on Their Destruction, Sept. 18, 1997, 2056 U.N.T.S. 211.
64. Christopher W. Jacobs, Taking the Next Step: An Analysis of the Effects the Ottawa
Convention May Have on the Interoperability of United States Forces with the Armed Forces of
Australia, Great Britain, and Canada, 180 MIL. L. REV. 49, 50 (2004).
65. Kohn, supra note 33, at 21.
66. Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, July 17, 1998, 2187 U.N.T.S. 90
(entered into force July 1, 2002).
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chance of Senate approval and President Bush “un-signed” the treaty
67
with the broad backing of the uniformed military.
Civil-military relations continued to worsen under President
George W. Bush, brought on by the stresses of the Afghanistan
conflict and the 2003 invasion of Iraq. This is not what would have
been predicted at the outset of the Bush administration, which had
campaigned on increases in military spending and an end to the lack
of respect for the military that had roiled the Clinton years. Yet even
before the September 11, 2001, attacks, Secretary of Defense Donald
Rumsfeld and the uniformed military struggled over the
administration’s “transformation” policy to make American forces
lighter, faster, and better equipped for unconventional conflict by
68
relying on high-technology and information advantages. Rumsfeld
also came to office believing that military leaders had grown too
independent under the previous administration and intending to
69
reassert stronger civilian control. Afghanistan seemed to bear out
the Secretary’s agenda. Rumsfeld ordered heavy bombing and the
quick insertion of light special forces and CIA units over the Army’s
recommendation of 50,000 to 60,000 troops. Quick success in toppling
the Taliban, in a country where no foreign power had prevailed
before, reinforced Rumsfeld’s belief in transformation and in
70
overruling the advice of military commanders.
The war in Iraq brought the struggle between the civilian and
military leadership out into the open. Pentagon leaders feuded openly
with General Eric Shinseki, the army chief of staff. Secretary
Rumsfeld announced Shinseki’s replacement fourteen months before
his scheduled retirement, during fights over the cancellation of the
Crusader artillery system. Shinseki then testified before Congress in
the spring of 2003 that “several hundred thousand soldiers” would be
needed to secure Iraq. Paul Wolfowitz, the deputy secretary of
defense, criticized Shinseki’s estimate as “wildly off the mark” and
71
said the more accurate figure was 100,000 troops. Wrestling privately
with General Tommy Franks, the CENTCOM commander, Rumsfeld
pressed for a small force to invade Iraq, on the order of 50,000 to
75,000 troops, whereas the United States had deployed about 500,000

67.
68.
69.
70.
71.

Kohn, supra note 33, at 19 n.52.
Id. at 14.
HERSPRING, supra note 48, at 381.
Id. at 388.
Id. at 395.
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troops in the 1991 Gulf War and military planners called for at least
72
250,000 in 2003. Although the eventual force was light, it defeated
Iraq’s military with surprising speed and low casualties, but was
insufficient to secure and occupy the nation post-invasion.
As conditions worsened in Iraq after the fall of Saddam
Hussein’s regime, the military became more critical of Secretary
Rumsfeld. Military officers anonymously criticized the Secretary for
refusing to send enough troops to pacify the country, and generally
attacked him for ignoring their advice and counsel. In an April 2006
act known in the military as the “revolt of the generals,” dozens of
senior retired military officers called for Rumsfeld’s resignation for
73
allegedly mismanaging the war. In 2006, retired general Gregory
Newbold, former director of operations of the Joint Chiefs, wrote an
essay in Time declaring that it was his “sincere view . . . that the
commitment of forces to this fight was done with a casualness and
swagger that are the special province of those who have never had to
74
execute these missions – or bury the results.” Part of the impetus for
the revolt was the deeper lesson, taken by the officer corps from
Vietnam, that the military had been too subservient to civilian leaders
and that they should talk straight to the political leadership about
their views. Ironically, the 2007–08 surge in forces in Iraq and the
improvement in the country’s rebuilding came against the advice of
the senior military leadership, which had decided that the size of the
75
American footprint in Iraq was part of the problem.
Dissension over Iraq was matched by contention over the
continuing war on terrorism. Perhaps the most public example was
Congress’s consideration of the Military Commissions Act of 2006

72. Id. at 399.
73. Michael Duffy, The Revolt of the Generals, TIME, Apr. 24, 2006, at 41, 41.
74. Greg Newbold, Why Iraq Was a Mistake, TIME, Apr. 17, 2006, at 43, 43.
75. See Michael C. Desch, Bush and the Generals, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 97, 104–05 (2007)
(“[S]enior U.S. Commanders believed increasing the number of U.S. forces in Iraq would be
counterproductive . . . [b]ut despite such protests, the military leadership was once again
overruled by civilians in Washington—leading to the ‘surge’ taking place right now.”); Richard
B. Myers & Richard H. Kohn, Response, The Military’s Place, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 147, 148 (2007)
(noting that senior military officials opposed increasing the number of U.S. troops in Iraq until
shortly after the 2006 bombing of the Golden Mosque in Samarra). But see Mackubin Thomas
Owens, Response, Failure’s Many Fathers, 86 FOREIGN AFF. 149, 150 (2007) (arguing that
military leadership had a habit of exaggerating the need for troops overseas to protect the size
of the defense budget or to discourage the executive from deploying a new mission).
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76

(MCA), which established rules for the detention and military trials
of terrorists. In November 2001, President Bush issued an executive
order establishing military commissions, in the form of a military
77
tribunal, to try al Qaeda members and their allies for war crimes.
Some members of the military’s Judge Advocate Generals (JAG)
corps wanted to use courts-martial instead, but civilian leaders in the
Pentagon favored commissions, which promised a flexible balance
between the need for an open, fair proceeding and the need to keep
78
national security secrets. In Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, the Supreme
Court held that the tribunals had to operate according to the lines set
79
out in Common Article 3 of the Geneva Conventions, setting off
Congress’s consideration of the 2006 Act. During congressional
hearings, JAGs for the Marines and the Army testified that
commission rules withholding classified evidence from the defendant,
but not his lawyer, would still violate the Geneva Conventions,
whereas the civilian representative of the Department of Justice
80
testified to the opposite effect.
Military disagreement over civilian policy in the war on terrorism
extended back to the beginning of the conflict. JAGs challenged
President Bush’s decision in February 2002, after extensive debate
within the executive branch, that members of al Qaeda and the
Taliban were not to receive the status of prisoners of war under the
81
Geneva Conventions. After that decision, JAGs reportedly
cooperated with private human rights groups to challenge the
decision in federal court. Once uniformed lawyers were appointed to
represent detainees in the military commission process, they
76. Military Commissions Act of 2006, Pub. L. No. 109-366, 120 Stat. 2600 (codified in
scattered sections of 10, 18, 28, and 42 U.S.C.).
77. Military Order of November 13, 2001: Detention, Treatment, and Trial of Certain NonCitizens in the War Against Terrorism, 3 C.F.R. 918 (2002).
78. Hamdan v. Rumsfeld, 548 U.S. 557 (2006).
79. Id. at 626. For discussion of the decision, see Derek Jinks & Neal Kumar Katyal,
Disregarding Foreign Relations Law, 116 YALE L.J. 1230, 1234 n.10 (2007) (providing a brief
summary of the Hamdan case); Julian Ku & John Yoo, Hamdan v. Rumsfeld: The Functional
Case for Foreign Affairs Deference to the Executive Branch, 23 CONST. COMMENT. 179, 181–99
(2006) (discussing the facts in Hamdan and the arguments presented by each side); Posner &
Sunstein, supra note 31, at 1223 (analyzing Hamdan under the Chevron doctrine established in
Chevron U.S.A. Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council Inc., 467 U.S. 837 (1984))
80. The Authority to Prosecute Terrorists Under the War Crime Provisions of Title 18:
Hearing Before the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 109th Cong. (2006).
81. See, e.g., Julian E. Barnes, Military Fought to Abide by War Rules, L.A. TIMES, June 30,
2006, at A1 (chronicling disagreement between JAGs and the White House over military
commissions from 9/11 to the Supreme Court decision in Hamdan v. Rumsfeld).
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dispensed with the secrecy and filed suit against the Bush
82
administration directly. Members of the uniformed military also
challenged the legality of holding suspected al Qaeda at the U.S.
83
Navy Station at Guantanamo Bay, Cuba. According to media
reports, JAGs representing detainees in the military commission
process met with members of Congress to seek their assistance in
84
reversing Bush administration policies on detainees. Congress’s
enactment of the MCA hewed closely to civilian preferences on the
commissions and the designation of al Qaeda as illegal combatants.
85
Although the Supreme Court, in Boumediene v. Bush, reversed the
MCA’s effort to prohibit federal habeas corpus review over the
86
detainees at Guantanamo Bay, it has not yet addressed the
substance of the MCA.
All of this has led historians and political scientists to warn of a
crisis in civil-military relations. Russell Weigley, a prominent military
historian, compared General Powell’s resistance to intervention in
Bosnia to General McClellan’s reluctance to engage General Lee
87
during the Civil War. By 2002, Richard Kohn, a distinguished
military historian, had already concluded that “civilian control of the
88
military has weakened in the United States and is threatened today.”
According to Kohn, “the American military has grown in influence to
the point of being able to impose its own perspective on many policies
89
and decisions.” He detects “no conspiracy but repeated efforts on
the part of the armed forces to frustrate or evade civilian authority
when that opposition seems likely to preclude outcomes the military
90
dislikes.” He believes that civilian-military relations in that period
91
are as poor as in any other period in American history. Michael
Desch argues that the high tensions in civil-military relations are due
82. See, e.g., Jonathan Mahler, The Bush Administration vs. Salim Hamdan, N.Y. TIMES,
Jan. 8, 2006, § 6 (Magazine), at 47 (detailing the lawsuit brought by Salim Hamdan and his
appointed JAG counsel challenging Hamdan’s detention at Guantanamo Bay).
83. See id.
84. See, e.g., Barnes, supra note 81 (noting that JAGs argued that it was “a mistake to
ignore the long traditions of military justice when trying terrorism suspects”).
85. Boumediene v. Bush, 128 S. Ct. 2229 (2008).
86. Id. at 2262.
87. Russell Weigley, The American Military and the Principle of Civilian Control from
McClellan to Powell, 57 J. MIL. HIST. 27, 31–32 (1993).
88. Kohn, supra note 33, at 9.
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 10.
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not to the military but to the civilians, which have violated
Huntington’s advice in favor of “objective control” by giving the
military broad discretion over tactics and operations while keeping
92
final say over politics and grand strategy. In a 1999 study, Desch
found that civilians prevailed in almost all of the seventy-five civilmilitary disputes from 1938 to 1997, but that the military has won in
93
seven or eight of the twelve post–Cold War conflicts. Some attribute
this discord to the regular give-and-take inherent in the civil-military
relationship, whereas others believe that the military has grown bold
94
in questioning the foreign policy decisions of the civilian leadership.
II. PRINCIPAL-AGENT THEORIES OF MILITARY CONTROL
The deterioration in civil-military relations shows the relative
poverty of the focus on the removal power as the primary means of
control of the administrative state. The president’s constitutional
authority to fire personnel is at its height with regard to the military.
There is no system similar to the civil service protections that shield
non-political appointees from removal. Other formal tools of control
are also greater over the armed forces than over other civilian
agencies. The president chooses which officers to nominate for
promotions, though every promotion requires Senate advice and
95
consent too. Although the great majority of appointments do not
require White House scrutiny, the appointment of general officers
and combat commands determines which military careers continue
and which ones end. The president can issue orders to the military
that have the force of criminal law behind them. Failure to obey an
order from a superior officer—and the president, as the commanderin-chief, is the top commander in the military—is a prosecutable
96
offense under the Uniform Code of Military Justice. No similar
sanctions apply to civil servants in the civilian agencies who refuse to
carry out a presidential directive.
Heightened tensions in the civil-military relationship during the
Bush administration illustrate the need for a more subtle

92. Desch, supra note 75, at 105–06.
93. DESCH, supra note 44, app. at 135–38.
94. See Herspring, supra note 48, at 342–76; Myers & Kohn, supra note 75, at 147; Owens,
supra note 75, at 149 (stating that the “military deserves a significant share of the blame” for the
deterioration of the relationship between U.S. military leaders and civilians).
95. See 10 U.S.C. § 624 (2004); Weiss v. United States, 510 U.S. 163, 166 (1994).
96. Uniform Code of Military Justice art. 90, 10 U.S.C. § 890 (2006).
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understanding of agency control. If elected leaders have trouble with
the military, over which their constitutional powers are strongest,
then their problems will be doubled with the civilian agencies. A
principal-agent approach, developed first in the context of
congressional delegation of rulemaking authority to civilian agencies,
may suggest ways in which presidents can increase their control over
the military.
Under a principal-agent model, initially applied to civil-military
relations by Peter Feaver, the president is the principal and the
97
military is the agent. The principal does not have the time and
resources to conduct military affairs; it delegates that authority to the
armed forces to take advantage of specialization. The problem is that
principals and agents have their own interests, and given enough
leeway, the latter may benefit themselves rather than the principals.
The classic example from corporate law occurs when management
locates a corporation in a state with plentiful takeover defenses,
which reduces the value of shareholders’ equity. Agents may prevail
by manipulating information or events or by taking advantage of
deference to their expertise to convince the principals to approve
policies that allow them to capture more of the benefits. Or agents
may be able to conceal self-dealing behavior from the observation of
principals, who delegated authority in the first place to reduce their
98
management of the issue. In the public administration context, the
deviation between principal preferences and actual policies carried
99
out by the agent is known as “agency slack” or “bureaucratic
100
drift.” The fundamental tradeoff becomes the principal’s desire that
the agent carry out his wishes, but without consuming resources in
101
excessively tightening its control over the agent.
97. PETER D. FEAVER, ARMED SERVANTS: AGENCY, OVERSIGHT, AND CIVIL-MILITARY
RELATIONS (2003). For an effort to apply the model to the question of the JAGs’ actions in the
war on terrorism, see Glenn Sulmasy & John Yoo, Challenges to Civilian Control of the Military:
A Rational Choice Approach to the War on Terror, 54 UCLA L. REV. 1815, 1831–45 (2007).
98. See FEAVER, supra note 97, at 55 (“[T]he employee has an incentive to do as little work
as he can get away with, all the while sending information back to the employer that suggests he
is performing at an acceptable level . . . .”).
99. See, e.g., Matthew Stephenson, Optimal Political Control of the Bureaucracy, 107 MICH.
L. REV. 53, 58 (2008).
100. Anne Joseph O’Connell, The Architecture of Smart Intelligence: Structuring and
Overseeing Agencies in the Post 9/11 World, 94 CAL. L. REV. 1655, 1702 (2006).
101. See Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 97, at 1826–27 (“Part of the goal in designing laws and
institutional structures, from the perspective of the principal, is to achieve the right balance
between the efficient delegation of authority and the costs of monitoring and sanctioning the
agent.”).
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A number of methods are available to tighten control over the
agents. The most obvious is for the principal to be more specific in its
102
delegations to the agent. Congress, for example, need not delegate
authority to the Environmental Protection Agency to regulate air
quality when it is in the public interest—it could instead specify
ranges for different pollutants. The president can achieve a similar
end by appointing and promoting personnel who share the same
policy preferences, and thus will use the delegated power in the
manner he desires. Congress can impose elaborate monitoring
mechanisms, such as reporting requirements, oversight hearings,
causes of action for third parties, and internal inspector generals,
designed to alert the principal when the agent is straying from its
wishes. Congress can even give the right to review agency decisions to
an independent actor, such as the federal courts, as a way of
monitoring agent activity.
Monitoring must be married to effective sanctions to counter
agency slack. In this regard, constitutional law focuses only on the
bluntest instrument—the removal of agents who fail to obey the
principal. Although firing a subordinate official may be a very public
sanction, it may not be calibrated properly to achieve the right change
in policy. Firing General MacArthur may have been justified because
of his desire to expand the war in Asia and his unwillingness to obey
civilian commands, but firing General Powell because he does not
provide a full range of options for intervention in Bosnia may be
overkill. Other sanctions could include reducing the scope of
delegation and hence the autonomy of the agent, cutting an agent’s
budget and size, transferring authority to another agency, or
promoting more trustworthy personnel at the expense of existing
leadership. A critical agency response to increased monitoring and
sanctions is to fragment the principal—in other words, to encourage
competing power centers within the principal.
A few observations are worth making before applying the model
specifically to civil-military relations. First, ex ante, multiple
principals may have different preferences about policy and therefore
may be willing to tolerate different levels of agency autonomy based
on their ability to control the agent in the future. In creating an

102. Matthew D. McCubbins, Roger G. Noll & Barry R. Weingast, Structure and Process,
Politics and Policy: Administrative Arrangements and the Political Control of Agencies, 75 VA. L.
REV. 431, 440 (1989) (“[T]he best solution is legislative specificity: writing into the law precisely
what the agency is to achieve, and how it is to do so.”).
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agency, for example, a majority in Congress may be concerned about
a future president who may hold different policy preferences. This
concern will be exacerbated if the majority is uncertain about its
ability to stay in control of Congress in future elections or the ability
of its party to win the White House. It will be willing to grant
significant autonomy to the agency, or to beef up review by an
independent actor like the courts, rather than allow the president to
103
dictate the results. Second, ex post, the divergence of principal
wishes from agency actions will depend on a few variables. The most
important factor will be whether the preferences of the principal and
agents deviate significantly. The farther apart that they are, the more
benefit to the agent of pursuing its own wishes. Another significant
variable will be the expected cost to the agent of sanctions for failure
to follow the principal’s preferences—a function of the chances that
monitoring will discover agency drift, the chances that the principal
will impose sanctions, and the likely magnitude of those sanctions.
The more principals spend on monitoring, the more likely they are to
discover agency shirking; the more they are willing to impose tough
sanctions, the less benefit the agent receives from shirking. Devoting
more time and resources to monitoring and sanctioning, however,
reduces the benefits to the principal of delegating authority to the
agency in the first place.
Applied to the military context, it is worth identifying how the
Bush and Clinton administration and civilian preferences may have
diverged from those of the armed forces. Unlike the Clinton
administration, both the civilian and military leadership were on the
same page in the area of budget and personnel. Under the Bush
administration, military spending rose sharply, both in absolute terms
and as a share of the federal budget. As a percentage of the federal
budget, Defense Department spending rose from 15.6 percent in 2001
104
($290 billion) to 21 percent in 2008 ($651 billion). Civilian and
military leaders may very well have disagreed, however, over how
that money should be spent. As noted earlier, President Bush and
Secretary Rumsfeld favored a restructuring of the Army to emphasize
smaller, lighter, and more lethal units that could deploy more quickly

103. See Stephenson, supra note 99, at 55 (“Forcing the politically responsive president to
share power with a partially insulated, politically unresponsive bureaucracy tends to reduce the
variance in policy outcomes, because bureaucratic insulation creates a kind of compensatory
inertia that mutes the significance of variation in the president’s policy preferences.”).
104. U.S. OFFICE OF MGMT. & BUDGET, supra note 26, at 74–85 tbls.4.1–2.
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105

to fight in smaller conflicts. Army officers may well have favored
keeping the focus on the large armored units designed for a broad
106
conflict against a major power such as Russia or China —hence the
conflict over the Crusader artillery system and the Comanche attack
107
helicopter. This tension signaled a larger difference over the
nation’s strategic goals in the wake of the Cold War’s end. Civilians
wanted a force shaped for the smaller conflicts, civil wars, nation
building, and humanitarian missions that characterized the 1990s.
Military leaders preferred the conflicts envisioned by the “Powell
108
doctrine,” which emphasized defeating an enemy quickly with
109
overwhelming force, defined goals, and a clear exit strategy.
The pressure of external events may have exacerbated these
differences. The actual combat phases of both the Afghanistan and
Iraq wars were relatively short and involved few casualties for
American forces. Whereas the latter was a regular international
conflict between two conventionally armed forces, the former
involved special forces, covert units, air power, and irregular allies
fighting a mixture of loosely organized militia units and terrorist
groups. Afghanistan required the United States to pivot quickly from
defeating the Taliban and al Qaeda units to rebuilding a national
government in cooperation with the Northern Alliance victors—a
task still unfinished. Nation building is at odds with the Powell
doctrine, because it requires military units to perform a police
function over the civilian population, with goals that are hard to
measure and difficult to achieve, and with no preset exit date. Iraq
called for yet a different kind of strategy, that of counterinsurgency,
which also deviated from the preferred focus on high-technology
weapons systems, armored units and air superiority fighters, and
105. See, e.g., John Hendren, Army Holds Its Ground in Battle with Rumsfeld, L.A. TIMES,
Nov. 29, 2002, at A1 (“Rumsfeld . . . has presented a clear, if controversial, vision of modern
warfare, one that uses fewer infantrymen and relies more on precision airstrikes and on small
groups of special operation soldiers.”).
106. Id. (“Army leaders, who still insist that some military engagements will require large
ground battles, have grown increasingly alarmed about what role their service plays in
Rumsfeld’s vision.”).
107. See Renae Merle, Army Scraps $39 Billion Helicopter, WASH. POST, Feb. 24, 2004, at
A1 (describing the contentious cancellations of the Comanche helicopter and Crusader artillery
system programs).
108. See Benjamin Schwarz, The Post-Powell Doctrine, N.Y. TIMES, July 21, 2002, § 7, at 11
(reviewing books challenging “contemporary military leaders’ embrace of the Powell doctrine”
(internal quotation marks omitted)).
109. See generally Colin L. Powell, U.S. Forces: Challenges Ahead, FOREIGN AFF., Winter
1992/93, at 32, 32–45.
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large-scale conventional warfare. Instead, the armed forces eventually
had to surge in large numbers of ground troops who patrolled in
urban environments, cooperated with local leadership structures, and
relied on intelligence to defeat al Qaeda operatives and Sunni
resistance fighters. The Army had engaged in counterinsurgency
operations in South Vietnam, sometimes to great effect, but had since
lost its expertise in favor of the tactics and strategies needed for a
110
conventional conflict.
Tension between the civilian and military leadership over the
tactics in the war on terrorism displayed a similar difference in
preferences. Civilian leaders believed that the war begun by al Qaeda
on September 11, 2001, called for a different kind of armed conflict.
The enemy is not a nation-state, but an international terrorist
organization that does not hold territory, has no population, and does
111
not use regular armed forces. Its primary tactic is to send covert
operatives, using the easy transportation and financial networks of
the global economy, to launch surprise suicide attacks on purely
112
civilian targets. It acts in direct violation of the laws of war, which
call on combatants to clearly distinguish themselves and to refrain
113
from targeting civilians. The war was not between nation-states, nor
was it a civil war limited to the territory of a single country—the two
categories of conflicts recognized by the Geneva Conventions of
114
1949.
The method of fighting the war was also to be different. Unlike a
conventional conflict, the United States would not prevail by fielding
larger armed units, out-producing the enemy, or winning through
maneuver or attrition. Rather, the gathering and analysis of
information would allow the military, intelligence, and domestic
security agencies to prevent terrorist attacks before they happen and
to target or capture al Qaeda operatives. Close cooperation between
international and domestic national security agencies was needed
because of the ease with which al Qaeda could operate across

110. Scholars, of course, will need the distance of time before they can make firm
conclusions about the reasons for the counter-insurgency successes in Iraq. For an early
journalistic account, see generally THOMAS RICKS, THE GAMBLE: GENERAL DAVID PETRAEUS
AND THE AMERICAN MILITARY ADVENTURE IN IRAQ, 2006–2008 (2009).
111. See, e.g., John Yoo, Courts at War, 91 CORNELL L. REV. 573, 575–76 (2006).
112. Id. at 576.
113. Id.
114. Geneva Convention Relative to the Treatment of Prisoners of War, arts. 2–3, Aug. 12,
1949, 6 U.S.T. 3316, 75 U.N.T.S. 135.
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borders. At the same time, the use of force required the capabilities
of individual units or unmanned airborne drones more notable for
their small size and mobility rather than their firepower. Precision of
targeting, rather than massive force, was the order of the day.
The military resisted the notion that the conflict with al Qaeda
was an unprecedented form of warfare. Instead, the JAGs’ resistance
to the president’s decision on the application of the Geneva
Conventions can be understood as an effort to fit the war within
traditional legal concepts. The Geneva Conventions, as originally
understood, created one set of rules for wars between nations and
another set for internal civil wars—the only two types of conflicts
115
contemplated in 1949 when the treaties were drafted. When nations
decided to extend the Geneva standards to wars of national liberation
and other asymmetric, unconventional conflicts, they drafted and
116
ratified two additional protocols to the conventions in 1977 —an
effort that the United States did not join precisely because of the
117
protections included for terrorists. Political leaders wanted to
continue the policy of not granting terrorists prisoner-of-war status
under Geneva, but also wanted to keep them in military hands rather
than turning the matter over to domestic law enforcement. Military
leaders, by contrast, believed that if the struggle with al Qaeda was to
be considered a war for which the armed forces could be used, then
Geneva standards ought to apply automatically.
The justification for this position shows the desire to keep the
conflict within traditional military preferences about warfighting. Two
basic claims were made to support the idea that the Geneva
Conventions still governed the war with al Qaeda. The first was that
even if the text of the Conventions did not apply to a terrorist group,
the norms of Geneva had assumed the status of customary
international law. The second was a policy argument that if the
United States did not adhere to Geneva, its enemies would act in the
115. See Sulmasy & Yoo, supra note 97, at 1835 (“[T]he laws of war . . . were drafted
primarily to deal with two types of armed conflict—wars between nation-states, and internal
civil wars.”).
116. Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to the
Protection of Victims of International Armed Conflicts (Protocol I), adopted June 8, 1977, 1125
U.N.T.S. 3; Protocol Additional to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and Relating to
the Protection of Victims of Non-International Armed Conflicts (Protocol II), adopted June 8,
1977, 1125 U.N.T.S. 609.
117. Message to the Senate Transmitting a Protocol to the 1949 Geneva Conventions, 1
PUB. PAPERS 88, 88 (Jan. 29, 1987) (“[W]e must not, and need not, give recognition and
protection to terrorist groups as a price for progress in humanitarian law.”).
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118

The military’s first
identical manner toward its own troops.
argument was an appeal to a sort of standard template for war
developed by the practice of states, one primarily developed by
nations that conduct few significant military operations on their own.
The United States, however, had objected to the norm by refusing to
adopt the 1977 additional protocols. The second argument,
concerning reciprocal treatment, would apply to a nation-nation
conflict in which both sides were capturing members of the other’s
armed forces and were concerned about their treatment as prisoners.
Al Qaeda, however, has no facilities for holding prisoners on any
large scale because it controls no territory. Even if it did, the terrorist
group shows no inclination to take prisoners, but instead has executed
both civilians and soldiers alike. Whether American extension of
Geneva to al Qaeda would make any difference in a future war would
be speculative, but the mistreatment of American POWs by almost
every enemy faced during the postwar period does not hold out great
hope.
Other elements of the war on terrorism would have clashed with
the sensibilities of an officer corps brought up under the Powell
doctrine and the lessons of Vietnam. The emphasis on victory
through overwhelming military force holds little application to war
with an international terrorist group. The difficulty is not in the
amount of force, an area in which western nation-states have an
unchallenged advantage, but knowing where to use it. Focus on a
clear goal and an exit strategy also finds little traction with the war on
terrorism. The war on terrorism is more amorphous and less
transparent than conventional armed conflicts between nation-states.
Conflict with terrorist groups does not often involve regular armed
forces units, but instead special forces, predator drones, and CIA and
NSA assets. It is unclear what the eventual goal is, because ending
terrorism itself is not possible; terrorism is only a tactic of fighting.
The goal could be simply the elimination of the al Qaeda terrorist
organization, though that would be difficult to achieve, and one that
might not have any publicly identifiable endpoint due to the struggle’s
decentralized, nonterritorial character. The lack of endpoint of the
conflict makes the exit strategy question a difficult one to answer.
The difference in preferences should lead to predictable
struggles for control over policy. The military will seek to gain
118. JOHN YOO, WAR BY OTHER MEANS: AN INSIDER’S ACCOUNT OF THE WAR ON
TERROR 34–35 (2006).
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autonomy by shaping decision options in its favor, whereas civilian
principals will increase monitoring and corrective sanctions to return
agency performance closer to their preferences. To take an earlier
example, the military drew the lesson from Vietnam that it had to go
to war with widespread support and sufficient resources for victory
from the American population, not just from its political leadership.
Generals decided to reorganize the force structure to incorporate the
reserves into the units that would be deployed if the nation were to
engage in any significant conflict, making it difficult for the civilian
119
principals to send the military into combat without popular support.
Overestimating the forces needed to achieve certain military
objectives similarly may alter the options actually available to the
principals. The agent can increase its autonomy further by delaying its
responsiveness to civilian orders or by providing a limited range of
information to the principal necessary to make a decision on all policy
options.
One visible tactic in the struggle over control was the agents’
efforts to divide the principals’ institutional unity. Increasing the
number of competing power centers among the principal, for
example, makes it more difficult for the principal to settle on a single
policy, to monitor effectively, and to decide to increase monitoring or
120
sanctions. In the war on terrorism, for example, JAG opponents of
President Bush’s policies went to Congress and testified against the
121
administration’s positions on the military commission bill. JAG
lawyers representing detainees at Guantanamo Bay also brought suit
in federal court to enjoin military commission proceedings from
122
taking place. Judicial review would provide another disruption in
the principals’ ability to coordinate policy. The JAGs’ appeal to
international law is understandable as an effort to create more
autonomy by introducing foreign governments, international entities
and NGOs into the principals’ decisionmaking process.
A number of broader changes in both civilian and military
personnel may exacerbate the gap in their preferences on particular
policy questions. The change that has attracted much notice is the
119. FEAVER, supra note 97, at 67. See generally HARRY G. SUMMERS, ON STRATEGY: A
CRITICAL ANALYSIS OF THE VIETNAM WAR 33–44 (1982).
120. McCubbins et al., supra note 102, at 439.
121. Kate Zernike, Lawyers and G.O.P. Chiefs Resist Proposal on Tribunal, N.Y. TIMES,
Sept. 8, 2006, at A1.
122. See Mahler, supra note 82, at 88 (detailing JAGs’ efforts to challenge the military
commission proceedings at Guantanamo Bay).
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growing difference between civilian and military values and
perspectives, which has expressed itself in a number of ways. Scholars
have observed that the officer corps, for example, has become
increasingly Republican in the last few decades, the likely result of
self-selection, Republican party outreach, and the decline in the
123
Democratic party’s hawkish wing after the Vietnam War. As a
result, the agency model would predict more friction during periods
of Democratic control of the executive branch, but it would not have
predicted the high levels of conflict under Bush. The introduction of
the all-volunteer force after Vietnam has reduced the number of
veterans in society at large and in the civilian political leadership in
particular, a dynamic enhanced by the reduction of the military’s size
after the Cold War and a drop in the number of bases throughout the
124
country. Civilians and military officers have come to have a growing
difference in both their opinions and their experience.
There is nothing normatively wrong with a difference in
preferences between civilians and the military. It is inherent in the
principal-agent relationship. Principals want to save time and
resources by delegating authority to agents. The latter naturally
desire autonomy in pursuing their missions. It is also not surprising
that in an area as fraught with significance as the nation’s security,
there will be strong differences in preferences beyond questions
solely of institutional independence. The phrase “shirking,” when
used in the literature on business organizations, implies that managers
are attempting to benefit themselves financially at the expense of the
shareholders—but it does not have that implication in the analysis of
the public sector. Rather, as here, it refers to examples when agents
seek to pursue their own interests rather than those of civilians.
Shirking, in fact, may better advance overall American national
security, should military policy preferences actually prove superior to
civilian preferences on an individual question. But it would come at
the cost of a reduction in civilian control of the military.
III. RESTORING CIVILIAN CONTROL
THROUGH DECENTRALIZATION
Turning from the descriptive to the normative, this Part asks
what presidents can do to address the growing tensions in civilian-

123. FEAVER, supra note 97, at 205–06.
124. Id. at 206–07.
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military relations. Under the principal-agent model described here, a
decrease in civilian control over the military could result from two
developments. One, deterioration in civil-military relations could
arise from a growing gap in preferences between the principal and the
agent over foreign and national security policy, as described in the
Part II. Two, military preferences may ultimately prevail in policy
disputes because civilian monitoring may fail to detect shirking or
because the chances of sanctions in response are low.
The agency model suggests that civilians can take a number of
steps to increase their control over the military. I should make clear
that this is not a matter of whether the military should shape its
advice based on what it thinks the civilians want to hear—a possible
concern if agencies are competing for a limited pool of funding from
the principal. Civilian leaders should want the military’s unvarnished
advice in order to reach the best decisions. Rather, the agency model
addresses how civilians can improve the military’s implementation of
decisions and reduce any effort by the armed forces to narrow or
unduly influence those decisions in its institutional favor.
Principals cannot do much immediately to change the
preferences of their agents, but they can make institutional reforms
that better detect and correct shirking. Civilians, for example, can
narrow the delegation of authority to the military by making more
decisions themselves or issuing more detailed, explicit orders that
provide for less discretion in implementation. They can enhance the
monitoring of military decisionmaking to detect efforts to deviate
from civilian policy preferences. This can be done primarily by
increasing the number of, and resources available to, civilians
responsible for developing policy in the Pentagon and on the National
Security Council staff. They can increase the sanctions for shirking by
promoting officers who are faithful to civilian wishes, removing
officers who defy civilian preferences, or reducing the budgets of
resistant services.
Several of these changes depend on the president’s constitutional
authorities. Agents will continue to pursue their own policy
preferences, even with a high likelihood of discovery, if the expected
cost of sanctions—the chances that they will be imposed and their
magnitude—remains low. The toughest sanction is removal from
office, which falls within the president’s sole constitutional power
under Article II. But firing will have little effect in response to serious
agency slack unless it is used with some regularity. A constant
possibility of sanctions also will not adequately address agency slack if
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principal and agent preferences grow farther apart, because agents
will claim more benefits even after the costs of monitoring and
sanctions.
This appears to explain developments in civil-military relations
since the end of the Cold War. It does not appear that civilian
monitoring or sanctions have fallen; in fact, they may well have risen.
The tension in civilian-military relations nevertheless has sharpened
because the difference between civilian and military policy
preferences has grown at an even faster rate. This should come as no
surprise. The disappearance of the Soviet threat, which had been the
overwhelming focus of American military planning for a half-century,
left both sets of leaders searching for a redefinition of national
security means and ends. Increasing reliance on the military for
operations that do not involve combat, such as drug interdiction,
nation building, and disaster relief, may draw the military more
deeply into civilian debates, increase the scope for disagreements
over the role of the military, and place strains on the military’s
resources and warfighting abilities. An all-volunteer force may have
exacerbated tensions as the military becomes more separate and
distinct from civilian society.
Removal from office may be both too blunt and too narrow a
tool to improve civil-military relations. It is too blunt because it is
overinclusive: presidential removal of an officer may arise because of
a single disagreement over policy, but might be seen as a symbolic
judgment on the officer’s entire career. Dependence on the
president’s constitutional authority does not provide more finegrained methods of responding to small-scale examples of agency
slack. It is too narrow because it is an inadequate way to change the
institutional culture of the agent. If resistance to civilian policy is wide
and deep because of military culture—as it arguably was during the
Clinton years—presidents will have to remove a large number of
officers, perhaps to the point at which military effectiveness will be
seriously endangered.
What is needed is a different way to improve control of the
military that is not dependent solely on firing and promotion
decisions. One such method is suggested by the comparative study of
civilian-military relations and the debate over intelligence reform.
Deborah Avant has observed that civilian control of the military has
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suffered less in Great Britain than in the United States. She finds
the difference in the former’s lack of a separation of powers between
the executive and legislative branches, which provides less
opportunity for the military to play its civilian masters against each
126
other. Indeed, one way that the U.S. armed forces may have won
greater policy independence is by dividing the principal by playing
Congress and the White House off one another. It must be
acknowledged, however, that this phenomenon may not correlate
with the end of the Cold War but instead may have been a persistent
practice in past periods of American history.
If unifying the principal is one way to increase civilian control,
dividing the agent may well be another. Dividing the military into
different services, but with similar missions, for example, may reduce
its ability to unify in its own struggle with the civilian principals.
Individual services may be less likely to shirk on civilian priorities if
they are competing with each other for budgetary and personnel
resources. Civilian principals can reward agencies who implement
their priorities most faithfully, or achieve the desired results most
effectively. This insight is supported by work on the centralization of
the intelligence community in the United States in the wake of the
9/11 attacks. The military first went through centralization in the
127
Goldwater-Nichols Act of 1986, which made the chairman of the
128
Joint Chiefs of Staff the primary military adviser to the president.
According to Feaver, the chairman’s increase in power came through
the introduction of the idea of a unified military viewpoint, which
129
came at the expense of the individual services. A similar impetus
has driven changes to the intelligence community in the wake of the
9/11 attacks. Before 9/11, several agencies operated intelligence
collection or analysis units. The Central Intelligence Agency is only
the most well known of them: the Defense Department, for example,
contained the Defense Intelligence Agency and the National Security
Agency; the Federal Bureau of Investigation was responsible for
counterterrorism and counterintelligence; whereas the Departments
of Justice, State, Energy, and Treasury each had their own
125. DEBORAH D. AVANT, POLITICAL INSTITUTIONS AND MILITARY CHANGE: LESSONS
21–48 (1994).
126. Id. at 22.
127. Goldwater-Nichols Department of Defense Reorganization Act of 1986, Pub. L. No.
99-433, 100 Stat. 992 (codified as amended in scattered sections of 10 U.S.C.).
128. 10 U.S.C. § 151(b) (2006).
129. FEAVER, supra note 97, at 82–83.

FROM PERIPHERAL WARS

YOO IN FINAL.DOC

2009]

6/24/2009 8:29:58 AM

ADMINISTRATION OF WAR

2305

intelligence units. Failures in detecting the 9/11 attacks and in
predicting the presence of weapons of mass destruction in Iraq both
led to investigatory commissions that recommended centralization of
130
In 2004, Congress enacted the
the intelligence community.
131
Intelligence Reform Act, which created a new directorate of
national intelligence to head the intelligence community and, like the
chairman of the Joint Chiefs on military matters, would act as the
132
principal adviser to the president on intelligence.
Whether to centralize agencies or create multiple entities
organized by specialty and expertise is a question that has arisen in
studies of both the corporate form and bureaucracy. As Oliver
Williamson has written, a firm that needs a good or service is faced
with several choices: should it purchase the item in the private
market, should it merge with or acquire another firm that specializes
in the function, or should it develop the ability to produce the item
133
internally. One of Williamson’s answers is that as the uncertainty of
acquiring the asset through contracting increases, because the good or
services is rare or must be made to specifications or its supply must be
dependable, firms will merge or grow larger to produce the product in
134
house rather than in the market. The reduction in transaction costs
brought about by performing multiple functions under one roof
should outweigh the costs in managerial complexity, loss of focus and
benefits of competition, and inefficiencies in operating a large
135
conglomerate. This transaction cost approach to understanding
institutions has important applications to administration—one
question relevant here is whether it makes sense to aggregate
different functions in one large agency, such as the Department of
Defense, or to maintain multiple, specialized agencies with somewhat
overlapping duties, such as a Department of the Navy and Army.
In the context of public administration, centralization holds the
promise of reducing redundancies, promoting coordination and
cooperation between agencies, and increasing agent accountability.

130. See, e.g., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT 411–15 (2004), available at http://www.911commission.gov/report/911Report.pdf (recommending a national intelligence director to
“manage the national intelligence program and oversee the agencies that contribute to it”).
131. Intelligence Reform and Terrorism Prevention Act of 2004, Pub. L. No. 108-458, 118
Stat. 3638 (2004).
132. 50 U.S.C. § 403(a)–(b).
133. OLIVER WILLIAMSON, MECHANISMS OF GOVERNANCE 66 (1996).
134. Id. at 70.
135. Id. at 67–70.
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Centralization can save significant resources by eliminating
duplicative redundancies, a particularly important effect for agency
functions that require large up-front investments (such as the
satellites needed for imagery intelligence). It can also improve
efficiency by forcing cooperation at lower levels of bureaucracy and
reducing turf wars. A common refrain heard in the post-9/11
commission reports was that different agencies were “stovepiped”—
they did not share their information or analysis except at the highest
levels of government, in failure to see the overall intelligence
136
Centralization might also improve accountability by
picture.
reducing the ability of agents to slack in their work and blame others
for failures. The unified direction of a single agency head will produce
quicker decisions and actions—which was Hamilton’s justification for
the Constitution’s creation of a single president at the head of the
137
executive branch.
But as Anne Joseph O’Connell and Richard Posner have
separately observed, centralization can also bring costs: the reduction
of competition between agencies, excessive focus on consensus, and
138
less consideration of low-probability yet high-magnitude threats.
Multiple agencies, for example, can help prevent the “group think”
that can occur when a lack of diversity of viewpoints occurs in
139
government decisionmaking. Principals will benefit if agencies have
to race to the top to produce the best intelligence analysis or collect
the most information, much as the private market forces firms to
140
compete to offer the best goods at the best prices. Competition also
acts as a safeguard in the event of a failure—it is less likely that a
crippling fault will affect multiple agencies, thereby improving the
141
reliability of the system overall. Increased competition will produce
costs that mirror the benefits of centralization—slower

136. See, e.g., THE 9/11 COMMISSION REPORT, supra note 130, at 401–09.
137. See generally THE FEDERALIST NO. 70 (Alexander Hamilton).
138. O’Connell, supra note 100, at 1685–86; RICHARD A. POSNER, PREVENTING SURPRISE
ATTACKS: INTELLIGENCE REFORM IN THE WAKE OF 9/11, at 42–43 (2005).
139. O’Connell, supra note 100, at 1676; see also Cass R. Sunstein, Essay, Deliberative
Trouble?: Why Groups Go to Extremes, 110 YALE L.J. 71, 118 (2000) (“Like-minded people
engaged in discussion with one another may lead each other in the direction of error and
falsehood, simply because of the limited argument pool and the operation of social
influences.”).
140. Cf. OLIVER WILLIAMSON, CORPORATE CONTROL AND BUSINESS BEHAVIOR 110–53
(1970).
141. O’Connell, supra note 100, at 1678.
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decisionmaking, reduced accountability, more expense in monitoring,
142
and greater agency slack.
Neither centralization nor decentralization should be applied
across the board. They represent polar opposites on a sliding scale of
agency design, with the appropriate point depending on
circumstances and agency mission. The military, for example, has
elements of both unification and redundancy. The chairman of the
Joint Chiefs, as has been noted, is an effort at centralization, as was
the creation of the Defense Department after the end of World War
II. Each service’s maintenance of its own air capabilities, command
staffs, and educational institutions is an example of redundancy.
Redundancy can also occur between the military and intelligence
community. The CIA has paramilitary units that bear strong
similarities to the military’s special forces units, whereas the Pentagon
consumes a large proportion of the intelligence budget through its
collection and analysis agencies.
Improving civilian control of the military would point toward
reversing the trend toward centralization that has taken hold in both
the military and intelligence worlds. At the point of policy
development, multiple agencies may lead to more varied and higher
quality advice. Competition would allow the principals to choose the
proposals and programs of the individual services that best match
their policy preferences on any given issue. Eliminating the monopoly
on military advice of the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, for example,
would allow more competition between the services in military
analysis and planning. The services would compete to solve military
problems posed by civilians principals—such as the most effective
way to stabilize Iraq or pacify the Afghanistan countryside—just as
different intelligence units might strive to present the best analysis of
collected data. The prevailing service would take the lead in
commanding the missions, which would result in greater resources
and broader responsibilities. That dynamic would present the
principals with more military options to achieve national goals, and
would act as an important check on agency shirking.
Competition may not just improve civilian control, but also may
lead to better decisionmaking. This would be particularly important
in areas where significant tradeoffs are present. To take Iraq as an
example, it may be the case that defeat of the insurgency could take a

142. Id. at 1679–83.
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longer time but with less investment of resources and personnel, or
that a faster strategy could be achieved but at the cost of a surge of
new assets. There may be no correct answer as to how to strike this
tradeoff as a matter of expert military advice. Rather, it should be a
decision for the civilian principals about whether to incur higher costs
for faster progress toward national goals, and competition among the
services will allow them to understand the tradeoffs at stake. Such
diversity of viewpoint might be particularly important as threats to
national security themselves come in different guises. A broader array
of approaches and insights will be necessary when the challenges are
unprecedented.
Decentralization might also be extended to competition in policy
implementation, which would encompass issues of force structure.
The redundancies in air support and special forces units has already
been noted, though it should be acknowledged that specialization
occurs in these units depending on the service involved (Navy Seals,
for example, would focus on waterborne or amphibious operations).
It might make sense for duplication to occur in specific areas in which
competition in function is particularly desirable. In responding to the
challenge presented by the al Qaeda terrorist network, for example, it
is not immediately apparent that any one service has a natural
advantage over the others. Allowing each service to develop special
units designed to conduct operations against cells of al Qaeda agents
may create a healthy competition. Civilian principals could choose to
assign missions to those services whose approaches best fit their
policy preferences, rather than those of the agents.
To take one example, Marine and Army units could take
responsibility for pacifying different provinces during the Iraq war.
Each service could attempt different strategies for conducting
counterinsurgency operations. One might try to reduce its footprint
by retreating to large bases and conducting brief, intense missions
because it believed that opposition grew in proportion to the visibility
of American forces. The other might opt for a more consistent, visible
presence in the hopes of winning the cooperation of moderate
elements of Iraqi society. Civilians could judge which service
encountered more success and direct additional resources and
responsibilities to that service. The more options available to
civilians, the more freedom they will have to choose policies that
more closely follow their preferences.
Or to take another example, the services may present different
options for attacking selected terrorist leadership targets hiding in
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areas with a high density of civilians. The Navy might propose cruise
missiles, the Air Force could use air strikes by manned aircraft or
unmanned aerial vehicles, and the Army could send in helicopters or
special forces units. Competition among the services will present
civilian decisionmakers with options along several different values,
such as speed, accuracy, flexibility, and destructiveness. The
principals will be able to choose the service that best presents a plan
maximizing the values sought by the civilians, which itself will depend
on the circumstances, rather than being limited to one course of
action.
As noted earlier, the introduction of more competition will not
come without costs. Redundancy of capabilities between the services
will increase costs and could lead to a waste of resources. The costs of
the Air Force, Navy, and Marines operating different types of attack
jets may well outweigh the benefits of specializing individual weapons
systems for a service’s unique mission. Specialization yields important
benefits, but redundancy might make less sense if large investments
are required. It would make little sense, for example, for the Air
Force to operate significant ground units. Decentralization might spur
free-riding rather than competition. Or it might create a destructive
competition and a race to the bottom if the services refuse to
cooperate. Decentralization might also make civilian control of the
military more difficult by making it more difficult to hold the military
directly accountable for errors.
Perhaps one way to address these concerns is to limit initial
efforts at decentralization to the staff level. The costs of redundancy
do not seem to be as pronounced at the planning stage or in the
Pentagon, when heavy investments in duplicate military personnel or
weapons systems are not required. This is similar to the conclusions
that some scholars have reached with intelligence reform. It would
not be cost effective for each intelligence agency to operate its own
satellite reconnaissance system, but it would be relatively low cost to
allow different agencies to view the same raw intelligence and
develop their own conclusions. Similarly, the individual military
services should continue to specialize in function, and even if they
must cooperate in carrying out missions, military planning on strategy
and policy could be opened to competition. Civilians would choose
among individual proposals offered by the different services to carry
out certain missions and functions.
Special forces is another area in which gains in civilian control
and effective decisionmaking might outweigh the costs of
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redundancy. Such units are small and do not consume a large
percentage of the services’ budgets. They could compete in
addressing post-9/11 missions such as tracking and attacking terrorist
leaders or blocking the proliferation of weapons of mass destruction.
Those units that proved superior in performing the mission could
receive more funding and resources, and their strategies and tactics
would serve as a model for others. Special forces may present a lowcost way to experiment with more competition among the services
without incurring large costs in redundancy.
These types of solutions might increase interservice rivalry,
which entails its own costs. Decentralization might also increase
civilian control problems by creating more opportunities for
individual services to ally with more congressional committees. But
the American system of civil-military relations already assumes
certain benefits from interservice rivalry. It already produces benefits
from both competition and specialization which appear to outweigh
the costs, at least to political and military leaders over time. Even
though civilian leaders created the Department of Defense after
World War II to increase centralized civilian control of military
matters, they did not attempt to meld the individual services into a
single force, and they still have not done so. The right mix of
centralization and decentralization in the design of the military
agencies will depend on the circumstances created by political history,
the nature of the external threat, and the costs and benefits of more
direct civilian control. I suggest here that when there is less
agreement on the most effective policies because of an
unprecedented form of external threat brought about by the end of
the Cold War and an expanded understanding of the American
position in the world, decentralization may create a healthy
competition that provides civilian principals with more policy options
and hence more control over their agents.
CONCLUSION
This Essay has sought to identify one of the most significant, but
also understudied, aspects of administrative law that arose during the
Bush administration: control over the military. It has explored a
principal-agent model, built on rational choice approaches to the
study of bureaucracy, to explain the apparent deterioration in civilmilitary relations. That model also suggests ways, such as
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decentralizing military command, in which civilian principals can
increase their control over their agents, if that is their wish.
As the Obama administration takes office, this approach suggests
that problems in civilian-military relations will not disappear, but in
fact might grow worse. As I have noted, the growing gap between
military and civilian outlooks and values sets the environment for
differences on individual policy preferences. In light of this gap, the
Obama administration might have problems similar to those
experienced by the Clinton and Bush administration. If that is the
case, then the new administration will need to devote even more
attention to the question of civilian control of the military than did
the last.

